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A bankruptcy proceeding where the debtor's counsel is a credi-
tor of the estate presents bankruptcy courts with a question which
they have yet to address uniformly. Some courts have held that such
a relationship is permissible, as long as the attorney's position is not
materially adverse to that of the debtor.' However, the majority of
courts have held that the creditor-attorney is per se disqualified to
represent the debtor under a strict reading of the Bankruptcy Code
and Rules.' Courts disagree as to whether such a relationship is
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I See, e.g., In re Microwave Products of Am., 94 Bankr. 971, 974-75 (Bankr. W.D.
Tenn. 1989) (holding that a professional who is a creditor solely because of pre-
petition work is not automatically disqualified); In re Viking Ranches, Inc., 89 Bankr.
113, 115 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1988) (noting that the disqualification exception carved
out by § 1107(b) for professionals previously employed necessarily includes those
who are creditors because of such prior employment); In re Best W. Heritage Inn
Partnership, 79 Bankr. 736, 740 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1987) (stating that in a debtor in
possession case a strict reading of the statute does not make sense to require a
disinterested attorney); In re Heatron, Inc., 5 Bankr. 703, 705 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.
1980) (holding that the debtor's pre-petition attorney does not have an interest
adverse to the estate merely by being owed fees and is therefore not disqualified).
2 See, e.g., In re Watervliet Paper Co., 96 Bankr. 768, 770 (Bankr. W.D. Mich.
1989) (holding that the debtor's pre-petition attorney was statutorily ineligible to
continue representation because prior unpaid fees rendered the attorney a creditor
of the estate); In re Roberts, 75 Bankr. 402, 413 (D. Utah 1987) (en banc) (holding
that a pre-petition creditor attorney does not meet the "disinterested person" criteria
and is therefore disqualified from representing the debtor); In re Estes, 57 Bankr.
158, 162-63 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1986) (claiming that a creditor attorney is not a
"disinterested person" under the Bankruptcy Code); In re Pulliam, 96 Bankr. 208,
213 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1986) (holding that a creditor attorney is statutorily ineligible
to represent the debtor in bankruptcy); In re Patterson, 53 Bankr. 366, 372 (Bankr. D.
Neb. 1985) (refusing to apply Heatron and holding that a creditor attorney is not
disinterested under the Code); In re Anver Corp., 44 Bankr. 615, 618 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1984) (stating that the exception carved out by section 1107(b) is for those who
would be disqualified solely for previous employment, not for those who were also
owed fees).
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allowable in the case in which the creditor-attorney's claim relates to
pre-petition work wholly unconnected to the current bankruptcy,
3
and in the case in which the attorney takes a security interest in the
debtor's assets to secure bankruptcy fees.4 Yet courts have moved
away from a strict reading of the Code, as such a strict interpretation
would make only pro-bono attorneys eligible for employment.5
The judicial inconsistency has led to unpredictable results, and
in the process the Code has become distorted. This Comment ana-
lyzes the differing treatment bankruptcy courts give a debtor's coun-
sel when the attorney is a creditor of the estate, and proposes certain
amendments to the Bankruptcy Code that will lead to more uniform
and equitable results. Part ][ lays out the Bankruptcy Code sections
that are the source of the confusion and controversy in the courts.
Part II exposes the differing treatment by the courts of similar factual
situations. This lack of consistency stems from the courts' various
interpretations of the interplay of several Code sections. Part III
explains why a hard line denial of representation, the majority posi-
tion, is not acceptable, and riot necessary since the system's integrity
will remain intact through the ethical provisions in the Model Code
of Professional Responsibility or the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct. Part III concludes with suggested amendments to the
Bankruptcy Code, which could lead not only to more consistent
results, but to ones more acceptable to all participants in the bank-
ruptcy arena.
3 Compare supra note 1 with supra note 2 (highlighting the different treatment of a
pre-petition creditor-attorney).
4 See, e.g., In re Martin, 817 F.2d 175, 181 (Ist Cir. 1987) (upholding the district
court's reversal of the bankruptcy court's invalidation of a mortgage taken as a
retainer, because § 327(a) "will not support . . . a bright-line rule" precluding all
retainer arrangements); In re Carter, 101 Bankr. 563, 565 (Bankr. E.D. Wisc. 1989)
(claiming that since a mortgage is merely a lien, and not a "right to payment," the
attorney taking a security interest in the debtor's property is not a creditor); In re
Watson, 94 Bankr. 111, 116 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988) (stating that the retention of a
pre-petition security interest in the debtor in possession's assets to secure payment of
bankruptcy related fees is not per se disqualifying). But see In re Pierce, 809 F.2d
1356, 1363 (8th Cir. 1987) (relying on In re Martin, 59 Bankr. 140, 143 (Bankr. D.
Me. 1986), aff'd, 62 Bankr. 943 (D. Me. 1986), vacated, 817 F.2d 175 (1st Cir. 1987),
in stating that an attorney's pre-petition mortgage on the debtor's real estate
constitutes an "adverse interest" under § 327(a)); In re Crisp, 92 Bankr. 885, 895
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988) (claiming that a security interest in the debtor's property
renders the attorney not disinterested under § 327(a)).
5 See infra note 19 and accompanying text.
WHY SECTION 327 (a) NEEDS HELP
I. THE CODE SECTIONS IN CONTROVERSY
The problem centers around the interaction of several sections
of the Bankruptcy Code, with section 327(a) at the hub. Section 327,
entitled "Employment of professional persons," states:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, the trustee, with the
court's approval, may employ one or more attorneys, accountants,
appraisers, auctioneers, or other professional persons, that do not
hold or represent an interest adverse to the estate, and that are disinterested
persons, to represent or assist the trustee in carrying out the
trustee's duties under this title.
6
This section applies to debtors in possession 7 through section 1107,
that states in relevant part:
(a) Subject to any limitations on a trustee serving in a case under
this chapter, and to such limitations or conditions as the court
prescribes, a debtor in possession shall have all the rights ... and
powers, and shall perform all the functions and duties . . . of a
trustee serving in a case under this chapter.
(b) Notwithstanding section 327(a) of this title, a person is not dis-
qualified for employment under section 327 of this title by a debtor
in possession solely because of such person's employment by or
representation of the debtor before the commencement of the
case.
8
A controversy arises whenever a debtor in possession wishes to
retain her pre-bankruptcy counsel as her attorney of record for the
bankruptcy proceeding. It is important to allow the debtor to choose
her own counsel freely.9 An attorney who has worked for the debtor
in the past will be more familiar with the situation at hand and need
not spend as much time familiarizing herself with the business. Also,
the debtor may be more willing to share records and other pertinent
6 11 U.S.C. § 327(a) (1988) (emphasis added).
7 A debtor in possession is generally understood to be the debtor, or bankrupt
herself, who is managing her own affairs without the oversight of a trustee. 11 U.S.C.
§ 1101(1) (1988).
8 11 U.S.C. § 1107 (1988). Subsection (a) also includes specific exceptions to
the general powers granted to the debtor in possession that need not be mentioned
here. For a discussion of these powers, see infra note 45 and accompanying text.
9 See In re Watson, 94 Bankr. 111, 114 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988) (holding that
"only in the rarest cases will the trustee [or debtor in possession] be deprived of the
privilege of selecting qualified counsel since the relationship between them is highly
confidential, demanding personal faith and confidence in order that they may work
together harmoniously" (citing In re Market Response Group, Inc., 20 Bankr. 151
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1982))); In re Roberts, 46 Bankr. 815, 845 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985)
(referring to the "social interest in obtaining counsel of one's choice"), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 75 Bankr. 402 (D. Utah 1987) (en banc).
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information with a lawyer she knows and trusts. These factors lead
to lower administrative fees to be paid out of the estate, and thus,
directly benefit the estate.'" Unfortunately, as with most long-term
business relationships, pre-petition legal fees are rarely paid in full,
and an outstanding balance often remains. This is especially true in
the months immediately prior to the bankruptcy filing, when the
attorney does not wish to push the client over the brink by collecting
past due fees." Thus, the attorney is a pre-petition creditor of the
debtor.' 2 This creates a problem, as section 327(a) clearly states that
a debtor in possession may only employ disinterested persons as
attorneys."3 A "disinterested person" is defined by section 101(13)
as one who, among other factors,
(A) is not a creditor, an equity security holder, or an insider;
... and
(E) does not have an interest materially adverse to the interest of
the estate or of any class of creditors or equity security holders, by
reason of any direct or indirect relationship to, connection with, or
interest in, the debtor.., or for any other reason.
14
A strict reading of the statute indicates that an attorney to whom fees
are owed prior to the filing is a creditor,' 5 and as such is not disinter-
ested.' 6 Under this interpretation, an interested professional person
is not employable by either the trustee 17 or the debtor in posses-
sion' s to work on the bankruptcy proceeding. However, such a strict
interpretation also leads to the situation whereby no attorney is
employable because as soon as she does any preparatory bankruptcy
10 See In re O'Connnor, 52 Bankr. 892, 895 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1985) (stating
"[a]s a result of machinations indigenous to the particular individual, from the
perspective of savings to the respective estates through curtailment of administrative
expenses, i.e. legal fees, it is advantageous that the same attorney, or firm, attempt to
unravel the Gordian knot constructed by the debtor").
11 Also, if a law firm were to collect the fees immediately before the client
became insolvent, they might have to be refunded as a preferential transfer. See infra
note 50 and accompanying text.
12 See 11 U.S.C. § 101(9) (1988) (defining "creditor" as an "entity that has a
claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief
concerning the debtor"); see also id. § 101(4) (defining "claim" as a "right to
payment" regardless of its status).
13 Although section 327(a) uses the term "trustee," the provision also applies to
debtors in possession, as noted pre~iously. See supra text accompanying notes 7 & 8.
14 11 U.S.C. § 101(13) (1988).
15 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
16 See supra text accompanying note 14.
17 See supra text accompanying note 6.
18 See supra text accompanying notes 7 & 8.
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work, prior to the order for relief, she either becomes a creditor'" or
has an actual conflict due to her preferential cash payment.2" Such a
result is absurd. Indeed, courts have admitted that such a strict read-
ing is not possible,2 1 but once they have moved away from the safety
of a bright line rule, they disagree as to where to draw an arbitrary
one.
II. CONFUSION IN THE COURTHOUSE
A. Generally
The disparate treatment by the courts has led to much confu-
sion. Court interpretation of the Code directly affects the debtor's
choice of counsel. Even if the court initially approves the debtor's
choice, the attorney may subsequently be denied fees if a violation of
section 327(a) is discovered.2 2 Section 328(c) allows the court to
deny fees for a violation of section 327(a):
Except as provided in Section 327(c), 327(e), or 1107(b) of this
19 See In re Martin, 817 F.2d 175, 180 (1st Cir. 1987). In Martin, the court
explained:
[A]ny attorney who may be retained or appointed to render professional
services to a debtor in possession becomes a creditor of the estate just as
soon as any compensable time is spent on account. Thus, to interpret the
law in such an inelastic way would virtually eliminate any possibility of
legal assistance for a debtor in possession, except under a cash-and-carry
arrangement or on a pro bono basis.
Id
20 See In re Roberts, 46 Bankr. 815, 849 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985) (stating "the
conflict of interest would not be eliminated if the law firm obtained from the client a
pre-petition payment of these fees and costs because such a payment would likely
constitute a preference that may be avoided for the benefit of other creditors ..
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 75 Bankr. 402 (D. Utah 1987) (en banc).
21 See In re Watson, 94 Bankr. 111, 114 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988) (stating that
such a strict reading produces "an obviously ludicrous result"); In re Best W.
Heritage Inn Partnership, 79 Bankr. 736, 739 n.2 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1987) (taking it
as settled that an attorney not paid in full for pre-filing bankruptcy related fees is not
disqualified). In Martin, the court stated:
[S]uch a literalistic reading defies common sense and must be discarded as
grossly overbroad .... It stands to reason that the statutory mosaic must,
at the least, be read to exclude as a 'creditor' a lawyer, . . . who is
authorized by the court to represent a debtor in connection with
reorganization proceedings-notwithstanding that the lawyer will almost
instantaneously become a creditor of the estate with regard to the charges
endemic to current and future representation.
In re Martin, 817 F.2d at 180. See also Roberts, 46 Bankr. at 849 (claiming "these pre-
petition fees and costs are recoverable as part of the fees allowed, generally, under
Sections 327, 329, and 330 of the Code and Bankruptcy Rule 2014").
22 See Roberts, 46 Bankr. at 849 (initially approving the employment of the
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title, the court may deny allowance of compensation for services
and reimbursement of expenses of a professional person employed
under Section 327 or 1103 of this title if, at any time during such
professional person's employment under section 327 or 1103 of
this title, such professionad person is not a disinterested person, or
represents or holds an interest adverse to the interest of the estate
with respect to the matter on which such professional person is
employed.2 3
If the attorney cannot be sure where the court will draw the line, she
cannot make rational decisions about whether to represent a prior
client in a bankruptcy proceeding. Even if she discloses everything
and is approved, she can later be denied compensation because the
judge reconsidered the issue.24 Also, if the attorney inadvertently
overlooked a prior connection with the debtor or an aspect of their
prior relationship that the court feels is material, she can be denied
fees. 25 Because attorneys may be denied the opportunity to repre-
sent their client from the outset, many downplay their prior dealings
and bury the information in the back pages of their application.2 6
Since sanctions are neither uniform nor absolute, these under-
handed practices many times pay off. The need for consistency
debtor in possession's attorney ba:.ed on affidavits claiming that the law firm did not
hold any interests adverse to the estate, but subsequently denying all fees upon
discovering undisclosed conflicts, even though the representation resulted in an
uncontested reorganization plan calling for full payment to all creditors).
Bankruptcy Rule of Procedure 2014 calls for the disclosure of any and all prior
involvement with the debtor in an application including: "any proposed arrangement
for compensation, and, to the best of the applicant's knowledge, all of the person's
connections with the debtor ...." FED. R. BANKR. P. 2014. Many courts state that
the attorney must explicitly lay out the potential conflicts and prior dealings directly
on the application and may not bury the information in the tables or schedules,
because "[it is not the duty of the bankruptcy judge to ferret out the falseness of
such a statement .. ." In re Estes, 57 Bankr. 158, 161 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1986). Other
courts view the inclusion of the information, regardless of its location, as a mitigating
circumstance and allow partial fees when the conflict is discovered. See Best W.
Heritage Inn Partnership, 79 Bankr. at 741 (stating that a firm will not be disqualified
for failure to reveal the conflict because, "[t]hose facts had already been revealed in
the schedules and statement of affiiirs").
23 11 U.S.C. § 328(c) (1988). The exceptions include section 327(c), which
deals with the hiring of attorneys who had previously represented a creditor; section
327(e), which deals with attorneys hired to handle connected tort or criminal matters,
and § 1107(b), quoted earlier, which deals with attorneys who had previously
represented the debtor.
24 See In re Heatron, Inc., 5 Bankr. 703, 705-06 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1980)
(sustaining an application to employ the attorney "subject to review from time to
time and subject to reconsideration upon objection of creditors").
25 See supra note 22.
26 See id.
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among the different judges and over time is critical. Courts are cur-
rently divided as to whether the attorney should be disqualified from
representing the debtor in bankruptcy when the debtor has a non-
bankruptcy related pre-petition unsecured claim, a non-bankruptcy
related secured claim, a bankruptcy pre- and post-petition cash
retainer, or a security interest, such as a mortgage on the debtor's
property. Courts often avoid the issue by disallowing the fees
because of the failure to disclose the potential or actual conflict, but
their dicta on whether fees would be allowed if there had been full
disclosure often differs markedly.
B. Non-Bankruptcy Related Pre-Petition Unsecured Claims
1. Representation Allowed
In the case of In re Heatron, Inc.,27 the debtor's attorney was not
disqualified even though he was one of the ten largest creditors of
the estate. Section 1107 states that prior representation is not in
itself disqualifying; but what of section 327(a)'s requirements that
the attorney not hold an adverse interest and be disinterested? The
court circumvented this hurdle by stating that "[i]t cannot be said
absolutely that being an unsecured creditor creates a position
adverse to the debtor.' 28 The court then concluded that "an attor-
ney who has represented the debtor prior to the filing of the bank-
ruptcy proceeding, who assisted in the preparation of the petition
and who is a major creditor, without more, does not have an interest
adverse to the debtor,"2 9 noting that,
[t]he fact that the attorney is interested, in the sense of being a
creditor because of prior service to the debtor, has less significance.
when his service to the estate will be only a continuation of that
prior function. The interest does not offset the value afforded by
the attorney's experience and familiarity with the affairs of the
debtor.
3 0
This view, however, is the minority position, and is followed by only
a handful of courts.
In In re Leisure Dynamics" the court relied on the Heatron analysis
of § 1107(b) in approving an accounting firm's application. The Lei-
sure court stated that Heatron stood for the proposition that a pre-
27 5 Bankr. 703 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1980).
28 Id. at 705.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 32 Bankr. 753 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1983), aft'd, 32 Bankr. 751 (D. Minn. 1983).
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petition debt from previous representation of the debtor was
included in the § 1107(b) exception, and accordingly allowed a cred-
itor-attorney to represent his debtor-client in bankruptcy.
3 2
More recently, In re Best Western Heritage Inn Partnership3 3 held
that the debtor's pre-petition attorney "should not be automatically
disqualified as a creditor because he is owed fees for non-bankruptcy
work done before the Chapter 11 petition was filed."', 4 Best Western
also held, however, that "[t]he attorney should still be disqualified
under § 327(a) if the claim for fees gives him an interest adverse to
the bankruptcy estate."'3  The court implied that it is possible to vio-
late one prong of the test, and be interested, without being disquali-
fied for employment. Although the court noted that the holding is at
odds with a strict reading of the Code, the judge reconciled the con-
flicting interpretations by claiming, "§ 1107(a) should allow the
court to distinguish between the rule applied to a trustee and the
rule applied to a debtor-in-possession based on the fundamental dif-
ference in their relationship to the parties interested in the Chapter
11 case."
3 6
The Best Western court looked to the legislative history of the
Bankruptcy Code to trace the reasons for requiring a disinterested
attorney, and determined that prior law had two business reorganiza-
tion chapters: Chapter X,, which contemplated a trustee in the
majority of cases, and Chapter XI, which rarely required one.3 7 The
court enumerated the reasons for requiring a disinterested trustee
and, consequently, a disinterested attorney: when a trustee is
appointed, she replaces the current management and directors of the
company.3 " Because this process seeks to ensure that the stockhold-
ers and creditors are treated fairly, the trustee must not be swayed by
feelings of favoritism or loyalty.3 9 It similarly makes sense to require
that the trustee's attorney be disinterested.
In passing the Bankruptcy Code, Congress extended the
requirement that the trustee be disinterested from business reorga-
nizations to other trustee cases. 40 The Best Western court stated, "[i]t
32 See id. at 757.
33 79 Bankr. 736 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1987).
34 Id. at 741.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 740.
37 See id. at 739 & n.1 (relying on 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1101.1, 1104.1
(L. King, B. Levin & N. Klee 15th ed. 1987)).
38 See id. at 739.
39 See id.
40 See Id. at 740; 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-703 & 1302 (1988).
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follows, as under old Chapter X, that a disinterested trustee should
have a disinterested attorney. It does not follow that a debtor-in-
possession should have a disinterested attorney."'" Indeed, the
court noted that neither old Chapter X nor Chapter XI required
debtors in possession to have disinterested attorneys,42 presumably
because of the differences between a debtor in possession and a
trustee. A current Chapter 11 debtor in possession is allowed to
retain her current management team, which gets the first opportu-
nity to file a reorganization plan.4" It is this interested management,
not the attorney, that gets the final say on the reorganization plan:
the presence of a disinterested attorney will be an "ineffective safe-
guard for the rights of creditors and investors."44 The difference
between a debtor in possession and a trustee also is illustrated by the
fact that the debtor in possession is not required to perform the
trustee's disinterested investigative duties.45  The Best Western court
stated that it saw "no particularly good practical reason for requiring
the attorney for the debtor-in-possession to be perfectly disinter-
ested."46 In fact, the court stated, "[a]utomatic disqualification [of an
attorney from representing a debtor in possession against whom he
has a claim for pre-bankruptcy fees unrelated to Chapter 11 filing]
simply does not make sense practically or logically, unless logic is
limited to cross-referencing the statutes."
'4 7
A 1988 California court cited Best Western with approval in In re
Viking Ranches48 Although it involved an accounting firm rather than
a law firm, the case's reasoning is applicable in the law firm context.
The court looked at the debtor in possession's right to retain its
management team and other professionals who are familiar with the
business and whom the debtor trusts.49 Most of these people would
be owed fees for prior work at the outset of.the bankruptcy, and to
require that they be paid in full beforehand would severely curtail




45 See id; 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (1988) ("[A] debtor in possession ... shall
perform all the functions and duties [of a trustee], except the duties specified in
sections 1106(a)(2), (3), and (4) of this tide .. "); id. § 1 106(a)(3) ("[A trustee shall]
investigate the acts, conduct, assets, liabilities, and financial condition of the debtor,
the operation of the debtor's business and the desirability of the continuance of such
business, and any other matter relevant to the case or to the formulation of a plan.").
46 Best W. Heritage Inn Partnership, 79 Bankr. at 740.
47 Id.
48 89 Bankr. 113 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1988).
49 See id. at 115.
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the debtor's ability to continue operations. The payment of the fees
prior to filing would be voided as a preferential transfer, thereby cre-
ating more problems than it would solve.50 The court also claimed
that the prior employment exception to section 1107(b) does not
make sense if it applies only to professionals previously paid in full. 5 '
The court held that "the better reasoning, and practical logic dic-
tates, that the term 'employment' under Section 1107(b), must
include, in debtor-in-possession cases, any professional who is a
creditor solely because of pre-petition employment.
'' 2
Just last year, the court in In re Microwave Products of America
5 3
followed Viking Ranches' reasoning and held that a public relations
firm that was owed fees for pre-petition work fell within the section
1107(b) exception and could continue to work for the debtor in
bankruptcy.54 The court criticized another court's decision in which
a law firm was per se disqualified under sections 327(a) and 101(13)
"notwithstanding 11 U.S.C. § 327(e) and (c), which provide that a
professional person's concurrent employment by or representation
of a creditor does not constitute a per se reason for disqualification
absent an actual conflict of interest."-
55
In In re Stamford Color Photo,56 the court stated: "[I]t is clear that
relationships which raise questions of professional impropriety do
not necessarily require disqualification and that approval of profes-
sional employment is within the discretion of the bankruptcy
50 See id. (stating that the seeking of fees whenever the firm is in financial
difficulty would taint the relationship and cause adverse interests to arise when the
fees must be recovered as preferential); In re Roberts, 46 Bankr. 815, 849 (Bankr. D.
Utah 1985) (stating that "such a payment would likely constitute a preference that
may be avoided for the benefit of other creditors, thus involving the law firm in a
conflict of interest as the holder of an interest adverse to the estate in violation of
Section 327(a)"), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 75 Bankr. 402 (D. Utah 1987) (en banc).
An extreme example of such a situation can be seen in the case of In re Michigan
General Corp., 77 Bankr. 97, 101-02 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987), aff'd in part, 88 Bankr.
773 (N.D. Tex. 1988), where the law firm had its client execute a wire transfer and
cashier's check for more than $340,000.00 one day before filing, in order "to
eliminate any possible conflict of interest between such law firm as a creditor of the
Company and its counsel .... " ItL The court viewed this as a preferential transfer
and subsequently denied all fees. See id.
51 See Viking Ranches, 89 Bankr. at 115 (claiming that if the professional had been
paid in full, disinterestedness would not be at issue unless the employment had
placed the professional in a materially adverse position, in which case the section
1107(b) exception would not apply anyway).
52 Id.
53 94 Bankr. 971 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1989).
54 See id. at 974-75.
55 Id. at 973 (criticizing In re Patterson, 53 Bankr. 366 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1985)).
56 98 Bankr. 135 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1989).
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court." 57 The court went on to say that "[a] court must balance the
right to freely choose counsel, the need to maintain ethical stan-
dards, the interests ofjustice, evidence of actual impropriety, and its
own ability to continuously control its officers and use the remedy of
disqualification if called for."58
2. Representation Disallowed
The majority view, however, is to disallow representation if the
attorney is owed prior fees. Many courts hold that by being owed
fees the attorney is a creditor and therefore statutorily disqualified
from representing the debtor. This is the result obtained if one
reads section 101(13), defining disinterested as "not a creditor," in
conjunction with section 327(a), stating that the attorney must be
disinterested. Although the judge in In re Anver Corp.59 wished to
apply Heatron and allow the representation, he stated: "it is not the
province of the courts to rewrite the statutes when they disagree with
the policy, or non-policy, behind a statute." 60 He continued, "[a]s
the courts have noted: 'it is not the responsibility or function of this
court to perform linguistic gymnastics in order to upset the plain
language of Congress as it exists today.' -61 The court looked at the
plain language of the statute sections and found no ambiguity. 62
Similarly, the court found that "there is no purpose or policy, in the
Code or its legislative history, that is contrary to the plain meaning
of the statute's words."63 Thejudge thus denied the debtor's appli-
cation to employ its pre-petition attorneys, stating "[the fact] that I
personally disagree with the policies behind the statute, is... irrele-
vant. As long as the choice was clearly expressed, it was up to Con-
gress and not the Court to determine policy."'
The court in In re Estes65 also refused to apply Heatron. Judge
Watson believed that both the case and the court would be "imper-
missibly tainted with an impropriety" if the pre-petition attorney was
57 Id. at 136-37.
58 Id. at 137.
59 44 Bankr. 615 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984).
60 Id- at 619.
61 Id (quoting Alabama v. Marshall, 626 F.2d 366, 369 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied sub nom., Donovan v. Alabama, 452 U.S. 905 (1981)).
62 See id. at 620 & n.3 (stating that if §§ 1107(b) and 327(e) seem contradictory
or duplicative "it is only because the House adopted § 1107 (b) of the Senate
amendments to clarify a point not covered by the House bill").
63 Id at 621.
64 Id. at 622.
65 57 Bankr. 158 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1986).
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allowed to represent the debtor.66 The court also held that a bank-
ruptcyjudge has the power "to revoke an order approving counsel's
employment by the debtor, without a request from any party in inter-
est and even when opposed by all parties represented by counsel.",
67
The judge concluded that Heatron erroneously relied upon decisions
that predated section 327(a) and treated disinterestedness "as a
redundancy to the requirement that no conflict of interests exists."
68
Similarly, the court in I;n re Patterson 69 disallowed fees because of
a per se violation of the statute. 70 The judge reasoned that even if
there were evidence that the general practice was to allow represen-
tation in these types of cases, he still had the duty to read the plain
language of the statute and look at the legislative history.71 The
court also found the debtor's awareness of the conflict to be irrele-
vant, claiming "there is nothing in the Bankruptcy Code that permits
the debtor to consent to the conflict.",
72
Other courts also have held that an attorney's pre-petition credi-
tor status is a per se violation of section 327(a).73 In re Roberts held
that "[t]he law firm, as a pre-petition creditor of the corporation, did
not qualify as a 'disinterested person' and therefore was statutorily
ineligible for employment. '74 In re Pulliam also denied fees because
of a per se violation, relying heavily on Roberts.75 In a more recent
case, In re Watervliet Paper Co., 6 the court stated, "[n]ot only a strict
reading, but.., the only reading of Sections 327 and 101 (13) of the
Bankruptcy Code renders [a creditor] Applicant not 'disinterested'
66 Id. at 160-61.
67 Id. at 162. Estes involved a reorganization plan which was on the verge of
producing favorable results for the majority of the creditors, and all of the other
parties were in favor of allowing the continued representation by the debtor's
counsel. The court said that the issue "is not a pragmatic assessment of results
produced by his representing the debtor in possession but whether he may do so
under the terms of the statute." Id at 161.
68 Id. at 162.
69 53 Bankr. 366 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1985).
70 See id. at 372 ("This Court is satisfied that a lawyer pre-petition creditor is not
a disinterested person under the Code and, therefore, is disqualified to represent the
debtor-in-possession.").
71 See id. at 371-72 (explaining that there was no evidence that the general rule
was to allow representation; and that after examination of the language and history of
the statutes, the court was compelled to conclude that the attorney was disqualified).
72 Id. at 374.
73 See supra note 2.
74 In re Roberts, 75 Bankr. 402, 413 (D. Utah 1987) (en banc).
75 See In re Pulliam, 96 Bankr. 208, 213 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1986).
76 96 Bankr. 768 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1989).
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and thus ineligible for appointment."-77 QuotingJudge Spector in In
re Gray,78 judge Stevenson wrote: "[t]he rule of disqualification is to
be rigidly applied; it cannot be waived because of the integrity or
ability of the particular person or firm involved."-79 The Watervliet
court further stated that a firm will be allowed to represent a debtor
only if it first waives its pre-petition claim, thus becoming
"disinterested. "80
The disagreement over whether an attorney with pre-petition
unsecured claims should be disqualified on a strict basis or on a case-
by-case analysis has resulted in unnecessary confusion. Yet the dis-
parate treatment and resultant confusion does not end there. Courts
that reject a per se disqualification rule disagree on whether the con-
flict in question must be actual, hypothetical, theoretical, or poten-
tial. Their explanations, and their reasoning, do not clarify the
matter. As one court stated: "[d]isqualification should be mandated
when an actual, as opposed to hypothetical or theoretical, conflict is
present. This in no way precludes disqualification for a potential con-
flict. The test is merely one of a potential actual conflict."'" On the
other hand, the Roberts court stated that "[dual representation] may
be potentially conflicting. While a potential conflict may justify fur-
ther inquiry by the court ... it does not by itself warrant a blanket
denial of all legal fees incurred by the law firm in its representa-
tion. . . . [T]he court must determine that a conflict actually
existed." 2 Another court held, however, that "[t]he concept of
potential conflicts is a contradiction in terms. Once there is a conflict,
it is actual-not potential.""8 The confusion is also not limited to
unsecured pre-petition claims, but extends to retainers and fee
arrangements of the debtor's bankruptcy counsel as well.8 4
C. Pre-Petition Secured Claims
Courts are in agreement that a secured non-bankruptcy related
pre-petition creditor is a per se interested person, thereby disquali-
77 Id. at 770.
78 64 Bankr. 505 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986).
79 Waterliet, 96 Bankr. at 773 (quoting Gray, 64 Bankr. at 507).
80 See Watervliet, 96 Bankr. at 774 (stating that the "waiver of this claim would
render the firm disinterested and thus in compliance with Section 101(13)(A)").
81 In re O'Connor, 52 Bankr. 892, 897 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1985).
82 In re Roberts, 75 Bankr. 402, 405 (Bankr. D. Utah 1987) (en banc).
83 In re Kendavis Indus. Int'l, 91 Bankr. 742, 754 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988).
84 See infra notes 85-124 and accompanying text.
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fled under section 327(a).85 But for some time, there has been disa-
greement as to whether the filing attorney may take a security
interest in the debtor's property as a condition of representation.
86
1. Bankruptcy Cash Retainers
The debtor's attorney becomes a secured creditor upon receiv-
ing a cash retainer due to, perfection by possession. 7 The courts
explain the seeming contradiction of allowing attorneys to accept
retainers by claiming that, although they are secured creditors, the
cash remains property of the estate until fees are approved. The
court in In re Burnside Steel Foundry Co. 8 stated that "there is nothing
per-se wrong with a debtor's attorney taking security for fees." 89 In
fact, the court described the practice as beneficial because it guaran-
tees the availability of cash when fees are ultimately approved. 90
85 See e.g., In re Automend, Inc., 85 Bankr. 173, 176 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988)
(stating that an attorney with a security interest in the debtor's property for non-
bankruptcy pre-petition work is per se disqualified from representing the debtor in
possession); In re Flying E Ranch Co., 81 Bankr. 633, 636-37 (Bankr. D. Co. 1988)
(questioning "who represented the interests of the unsecured creditors and the
Debtor" in dealing with the security interest taken by the debtor's own attorney); In
re Watson, 94 Bankr. 111, 116 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988) (holding that although taking
a security interest to secure payment of bankruptcy fees is permissible, a security
interest for non-bankruptcy work will result in the attorney's disqualification).
86 See, e.g., In re Pierce, 809 F.2d 1356, 1363 (8th Cir. 1987) (noting that
attorney's fees may be denied if the attorney holds an interest adverse to the estate,
but that this issue is left to the trial court's discretion); In re Crisp, 92 Bankr. 885,
894-95 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988) (stating that fees may be denied if attorney's interest
is adverse to that of the estate); In re Martin, 59 Bankr. 140, 143 (Bankr. D. Me. 1986)
(noting that an attorney must not hold an interest adverse to the estate), af'd, 62
Bankr. 943 (D. Me. 1986), vacated and remanded, 817 F.2d 175 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding
that a mortgage in the debtor's property taken as a retainer is not per se invalid, but
rather required a finding as to whether potential conflict between attorney and
debtors rendered attorney's interest materially adverse to estate or creditors).
87 See UCC § 9-305 (1989) ("A security interest in . . . money . . . may be
perfected by the secured party's taking possession of the collateral.").
88 90 Bankr. 942 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988).
89 Id. at 944.
90 See id. However, because the cash remains property of the estate, it is
available for use by the trustee or debtor with consent of the court. Therefore, an
opposite conclusion may be reached and the cash may not exist at the conclusion of
the bankruptcy proceeding. Also, if the cash is spent by the trustee, the attorney no
longer has possession, and therefore no longer has a secured claim. See generally
United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198 (1983) (discussing the elements of
the estate and maintaining that the trustee's authority to use, sell, or otherwise
convert assets extends even to property subject to a security interest). If a secured
party with an interest in the cash collateral is uncomfortable with the debtor's use of
the cash, she can file a motion under § 363(e) requesting the court to "prohibit or
condition such use . . . as is necessary to provide adequate protection of such
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Furthermore, in the event of a conversion to a Chapter 7 liquidation,
the attorney's claim, as a secured transaction, does not get
subordinated to administrative expenses.9' However, what effect the
secured status of this claim will have on the attorney's ability to help
the trustee in the Chapter 7 liquidation proceeding is questionable.
9 2
Courts do not recognize a conflict of interest between the attor-
ney and trustee in Chapter 11 proceedings because the attorney does
not have a "claim" for fees until the judge approves the fee state-
ment. Therefore, the security interest in the fees actually arises after
the bankruptcy proceeding is over.9" The use of a retainer would
not constitute a claim either. A retainer for expenses is only allowed
if disclosed and approved; its use is treated as the awarding of
interim fees. Yet interim fees are not considered final until the final
fee application is approved by the judge. 4 Thus, if the retainer is
excessive, it is subject to turnover pursuant to Bankruptcy Code sec-
tion 329 and rule 2017.9" Furthermore, it is critical that the court
regard the retainer as security for future fees rather than a flat fee
payment in advance. 96 A flat fee agreement would be avoided as a
preferential transfer, and disqualify the attorney from representing
the debtor.9 7 Because of these clearly detrimental results, the word-
ing of a fee arrangement is crucial. The complexity inherent in
regarding an attorney's retainer as a secured claim is even more
apparent when the security interest is not in cash, but in real estate
or other assets.
interest." In re Cropper Co., Inc., 35 Bankr. 625, 633 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1983)
(quoting 11 U.S.C.A. § 363(e) (West 1979)). But if the secured party is the debtor's
attorney, such a motion would constitute a conflict of interest.
91 See Burnside Steel Foundry, 90 Bankr. at 944.
92 The court in Burnside Steel does not question this, but under a per se rule, the
attorney will be a creditor of the estate, and therefore unemployable by the trustee.
93 See In re Fidelity Mortgage Investors, 12 Bankr. 641, 644 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(stating that an attorney's right to payment "accrued only when the Bankruptcy
Judge made the determination as to what sum represented fair and reasonable
compensation for such services").
94 See Burnside Steel Foundry, 90 Bankr. at 944.
95 Section 329(b) states in relevant part: "[if the attorney's] compensation
exceeds the reasonable value of any such services, the court may cancel any such
agreement, or order the return of any such payment, to the extent excessive .... " 11
U.S.C. § 329(b) (1988). Rule 2017, entitled "Payment or Transfer to Attorney
Before Commencement of Case," provides that upon motion by any party or the
court, the court may determine whether any payment of fees or transfer of property
to the debtor's attorney was excessive. See Bankr. R.P. 2017.
96 See Burnside Steel Foundry, 90 Bankr. at 945 n. 1 (explaining the Code's differing
treatment of a flat fee and a retainer and the resultant consequences).
97 See supra notes 69-79 and accompanying text.
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2. Other Security Interest Retainers
The seminal case discussing the use of a mortgages claimed as a
security interest is In re Martin.98 The Martin court reversed a lower
court's determination that a mortgage in the debtor's property was
per se invalid. The bankruptcy court held that the mortgage had to
be voided.99  However, the appeals court held that "§ 327(a) will
not support, either by its terms or by its objectives, a bright-line rule
precluding an attorney at all times and under all circumstances from
taking a security interest to safeguard the payment of his fees."'
00
The court drew a distinction between the always present danger of
the lawyer's judgment being clouded by his own economic interests,
and the extreme case where a lawyer sets aside the most promising
assets of the debtor as a precondition of representation. 01 The
appeals court reasoned that determination of the propriety of such a
fee arrangement should be made on a case by case basis.' 0 2 The
court noted that "the Code is less than explicit in mapping the con-
tours of the disinterestedness requirement."'' 0 3 Moreover, the court
posited that although a security interest ties up much needed assets,
debtors are often short of cash, and "[r]eason requires that a balance
be struck" in allowing some security arrangements.'
0 4
In so holding, the Martin appeals court strayed from the strict
definition of disinterestedness, seeing the "twin requirements of dis-
interestedness and lack of adversity"' 1 5 as a single issue-whether
the attorney had an incentive to act contrary to the best interests of
the estate or the reasonable perception of such an interest. 10 6 The
court stated that "[t]he naked existence of a potential for conflict of
interest does not render the appointment of counsel nugatory, but
makes it voidable as the facts may warrant."' 0 7 The important ques-
tion is "whether a potential conflict, or the perception of one, ren-
ders the lawyer's interest materially adverse to the estate or the
creditors. '18 Thus, the court managed to work its way through the
98 817 F.2d 175 (1st Cir. 1987).
99 See In re Martin, 59 Bankr. "[40, 143 (Bankr. D. Me. 1986), aft'd, 62 Bankr. 943
(D. Me. 1986), vacated, 817 F.2d 175 (1st Cir. 1987).
100 In re Martin, 817 F.2d at 181.
101 See id.
102 See id. at 181-82.
103 Id. at 181.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 180.
106 See id.
107 Id. at 182.
108 Id.
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issue of disinterestedness without clarifying the criteria that would
trigger disqualification. In essence, the court claimed that the attor-
ney will only be disqualified if he is actually adverse; however, adver-
sity can arise from a potential conflict of interest or the perception of
one." 9 Accordingly, the court also stated that while "[not] every
conceivable conflict must result in sending counsel away to lick his
wounds ... doubts are to be resolved in favor of invalidation."
' 1 0
In an effort to clarify this ambiguous standard, the court noted
the relevant issues to be considered in determining the propriety of
counsel's taking a security interest in a mortgage:
[T]he court should consider the full panoply of events and ele-
ments: the reasonableness of the arrangement and whether it was
negotiated in good faith, whether the security demanded was com-
mensurate with the predictable magnitude and value of the fore-
seeable services, whether it was a needed means of ensuring the
engagement of competent counsel, and whether or not there are
tell-tale signs of overreaching. The nature and extent of the con-
flict must be assayed, along with the likelihood that a potential con-
flict may turn into an actual one .... Perceptions are important;
how the matter likely appears to creditors and to other parties in
legitimate interest should be taken into account.
111
The court admitted that this list of factors was not all-inclusive, and
emphasized that the most important concern is that "the matter not
be left either to hindsight or the unfettered desires of the debtor and
his attorney, but that the bankruptcy judge be given an immediate
opportunity to make an intelligent appraisal of the situation.
' 112
The reasoning of Martin has been followed in subsequent
cases.1 1 3 One court elaborated on Martin, claiming that an order
approving a security interest should be obtained before taking it." 4
The court in In re Shah International, Inc. 11 5 agreed that a security
interest to secure fees was permissible, but noted that this was always
the case, as the security interest, like a cash retainer, remained the
property of the estate. The court claimed that "[t]he granting of the
mortgages will have little, if any, impact on pre-petition unsecured
creditors because the expenses of administration must be paid
109 See id at 183.
110 Id.
111 1d at 182.
112 Id.
113 See In re Carter, 101 Bankr. 563, 565-66 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1989); In re
Watson, 94 Bankr. 111, 115-16 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988).
114 See In re Automend, Inc., 85 Bankr. 173, 179-80 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988).
115 94 Bankr. 136 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1988).
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before the pre-petition unsecured creditors receive any distribution.
It matters not to unsecured creditors whether the expenses of
administration are secured." ' 6 The court found that there was no
legally significant difference between the mortgage and a cash
retainer, and that the attorneys were disinterested persons under
sections 101(13) and 327(a).'"
7
Other courts, however, have relied upon the lower Martin
court's reasoning, and have held that an attorney's pre-petition
mortgage on the debtor's real estate, as security for bankruptcy fees,
constitutes an "adverse interest" under section 327(a)." 8 The lower
Martin court, after setting forth the applicable Code sections (sec-
tions 327(a), 1107(a), and 101(13)) reasoned that the attorneys held
an adverse interest and were not disinterested. 19 The court essen-
tially followed the same line of reasoning as the In re Roberts 120 opin-
ion by holding that pre-petition non-bankruptcy creditors were per
se disqualified. The court stated that a law firm "should not have
been employed as attorneys for the debtors in possession with the
court's approval without divesting itself of its interest in the debtors'
property. In future cases employment under such circumstances will
not be approved."' 2 ' The court pointed out that "[t]he potential for
conflicting loyalties are many .... The Code does not permit such
potential conflicts."' 22 But the court then stated that "[i]t does,
however, permit a retainer, subject to review by the court under Sec-
tion 329. ... ',12' The court did not explain the relevance of this last
sentence, although it had found that the mortgage was executed to
serve as a retainer.'
24
The widespread confusion and varying interpretations of what is
allowable under section 327(a) makes it unworkable. The interaction
of the sections creates a convoluted mess that leads to problematic
results if read literally, and uncertain results if interpreted with a
sense of reality. The Code, therefore, needs revision. I shall now
116 Id. at 137.
117 See id. at 138.
118 See In re Pierce, 809 F.2d 1356, 1363 (8th Cir. 1987). Pierce relied on In re
Martin, 59 Bankr. 140, 143 (Bankr. D. Me. 1986) (claiming that a security interest in
the debtor's property renders the attorney not disinterested under section 327(a)),
aft'd, 62 Bankr. 943 (D. Me. 1986), vacated, 817 F.2d 175 (1st Cir. 1987).
119 See Martin, 59 Bankr. at 142-43.
120 46 Bankr. 815, 849, aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 75 Bankr. 402 (D. Utah 1987).
121 Martin, 59 Bankr. at 144.
122 Id. at 143.
123 Id.
124 See id. at 141.
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turn to the results that make practical sense to the courts, attorneys,
creditors, and debtors, and that should be promoted by the Bank-
ruptcy Code.
III. REVISING THE CODE
A. The Problem
Courts to date have been at odds over the importance of the
debtor's right to representation by counsel of her choice. Courts
that permit the creditor-attorney's representation believe that the
debtor's right to choose counsel is a most important considera-
tion. 12 5 Those that disallow representation give the right mere lip
service, and conclude that the interests of the estate are more impor-
tant. 12 6 Yet these latter courts fail to recognize that the two con-
cerns are not mutually exclusive. As stated earlier, the debtor's prior
counsel is in the best position to understand the complex financial
situation that faces the creditors and the court.1 2 7 Not only does the
attorney understand the debtor's business and its financial history,
but the attorney has the debtor's confidence as well. This is not to
be taken lightly. If the debtor is not comfortable with her counsel,
critical disclosures may not be made in a timely manner, and this may
lead to wasted time and funds. Non-disclosure could also lead to
irreparable harm by causing a failure to meet non-bankruptcy
deadlines.'
28
In many cases, the unsecured status of the attorney's past fees
will cause counsel to work harder to devise the best possible plan. 129
125 See, e.g., In re Stamford Color Photo, 98 Bankr. 135, 137 (Bankr. D. Conn.
1989) (finding that there were no allegations of misconduct sufficient to overcome
the debtor's right to choose its counsel); In reWatson, 94 Bankr. 111, 114 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 1988) (noting that in only the rarest cases will a debtor in possession be
deprived of the privilege of selecting her own attorney).
126 See In re Roberts, 46 Bankr. 815, 845 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, 75 Bankr. 402 (D. Utah 1987) (en banc).
127 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
128 Missed bankruptcy deadlines do not usually lead to irreparable damage,
because nunc pro tunc orders will often be granted when the equities of the case so
demand; but these orders are ineffectual against outside forces, such as when a delay
causes a missed purchasing option in the marketplace.
129 See In re Anver Corp., 44 Bankr. 615, 619 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984) (stating
that "an equity security holder/counsel would appear to be in the best position to
represent the debtor vigorously"). This, of course, is not always the case. A law firm
may be tempted to raid the estate when faced with the prospect of being paid only a
fraction of its past due fees, as occurred in In re Michigan General Corp., 77 Bankr.
97, 101-02 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987), aff'd in part, sub nom., In re Diamond Lumber, 88
Bankr. 773 (N.D. Tex. 1988), discussed supra note 50. In this case the law firm
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As an unsecured creditor, the attorney will strive for a plan that will
pay off the claims of the secured creditors and leave the most funds
possible remaining for the general unsecured creditors. This, in
essence, is the goal of all bankruptcy plans. If the attorney is a
secured creditor, however, she may not have this incentive. The
attorney will get paid if the secured creditors are paid, but it matters
not at all to the attorney if the unsecured creditors receive any-
thing. 3 ' It is in such a situation that conflicts can occur. Therefore,
the unsecured creditor-attorney should generally be allowed to rep-
resent a debtor. If the attorney is a secured creditor, however, she
must make the choice of either refusing employment and maintain-
ing her secured status, or representing the debtor and having her
claim automatically converted to an unsecured one. Under current
Code interpretations the secured creditor-attorney does not have
this option, and must always abstain from representing the debtor.
The situations in which an attorney with an unsecured claim
would not act in the best interests of the estate can be handled under
the Professional Ethics standards which govern the conduct of all
attorneys. Bankruptcy attorneys are generally subject to the ethics
standards of the Model Code or Model Rules through provisions
made by the state supreme courts.
13
Perhaps the best discussion of bankruptcy ethics is Judge Clark's
opinion in the 1985 case of In re Roberts.'" 2 He sets forth the applica-
ble Canons from the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, start-
ing with Canon 1. Canon 1 states: "A Lawyer Should Assist in
Maintaining the Integrity and Competence of the Legal Profes-
violated many of the anti-conflict provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and the Model
Rules, in that it accepted a transfer of funds from the debtor-client with the
knowledge that the debtor's checks were likely to be returned for insufficient funds,
was an insider under § 101(25), represented more than one of the debtors, and
initially failed to disclose many oF these facts in clear violation of rule 2014. 'Such
abuses will occasionally occur regardless of the wording of rule 327(a), but can be
handled best through more demanding disclosure requirements and corresponding
sanctions.
130 Cf In re O'Connor, 52 Bankr. 892, 896 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1985) (stating
that although the court did not doubt that the debtors would "enjoy seeing a... plan
of reorganization which maximizes the potential for return in favor of the equity
security holders, to imply that the reorganization efforts . . .will be channeled in
favor of equity security holders to the exclusion of all other creditors ignores the
practical reality of 11 U.S.C. § 1129").
131 For an in-depth analysis of the Code of Ethic's relevance in bankruptcy
proceedings, see the discussion set forth by Judge Clark in In re Roberts, 46 Bankr.
815, 829-37 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 75 Bankr. 402 (D. Utah
1987) (en banc).
132 See id.
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sion."' 33 Disciplinary Rule 1-102 clarifies this tenet by stating that it
is misconduct for a lawyer to violate a disciplinary rule or "[e]ngage
in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice."
' 34
This compliments Canon 9, which states: "A Lawyer Should Avoid
Even the Appearance of Professional Impropriety."'
35
Bankruptcy courts have placed much emphasis on the idea of
maintaining public respect for, and confidence in, the bankruptcy
system, many times referring to the "appearance of impropriety."'
' 6
In In re Philadelphia Athletic Club, Inc., 137 the court stated, "the avoid-
ance of a real appearance of impropriety is of chief concern to a
court of bankruptcy .... It is not sufficient that the trustee and his
counsel actually be disinterested; the appearance of [interestedness]
must also be avoided."' 38  Similarly, another court stated, "[ilt
becomes the duty of the trustee and of his attorneys not only to be
impartial and free from the influence of any secured holder, but the
other security holders must have faith and confidence in their impar-
tiality and independence.'"'
39
However, if one agrees with the reasoning of Heatron and its
progeny, then the attorney of the debtor in possession does not need
to be completely impartial, and can be a creditor of the debtor.'
40
The court in In re Stamford Color Photo stated, "it is clear that relation-
ships which raise questions of professional impropriety do not neces-
sarily require disqualification. . . ." 41 This degree of self-interest
should not greatly affect the confidence level of the other parties,
13 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 1 (1989).
134 Id. at DR 1-102(A)(5).
135 Id. at Canon 9.
136 See, e.g., In re Estes, 57 Bankr. 158, 161 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1986) (explaining
that it is the role of the courts rather than the bar to maintain the integrity of the legal
system); In re Roberts, 46 Bankr. 815, 844-46 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985) (disqualifying
law firm under Canon 9 for its failure to disclose conflict to corporate debt client),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 75 Bankr. 402 (D. Utah 1987) (en banc); In re Philadelphia
Athletic Club, Inc., 20 Bankr. 328, 335-37 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (emphasizing the court's
duty to consider whether the reputation of the bar would be lowered in the eyes of an
informed and concerned private citizen if the representation were allowed to
continue).
137 20 Bankr. 328 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
138 Id. at 335 (quoting In re Perry, Adams & Lewis Securities, 5 Bankr. 63, 64
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1980)).
139 In re Perry, Adams & Lewis Securities, 5 Bankr. 63, 64 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.
1980) (quoting In re Chicago Rapid Transit Co., 93 F.2d 832, 838 (7th Cir. 1937))
(emphasis omitted).
140 See supra text accompanying notes 27-58.
141 In re Stamford Color Photo, Inc., 98 Bankr. 135, 136-37 (Bankr. D. Conn.
1989).
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because the attorney's concern for fees is ever-present. Consider,
for example, the common. case of a contingent fee arrangement.
Here the lawyer is swayed by her own interests and may be tempted
to go for the big payoff or the quick settlement, depending upon her
own needs rather than those of the client. The attorney, however, is
bound by her duty of loyalty to represent the client's best interests,
not her own.
The "appearance of impropriety" standard has often been criti-
cized as vague and unworkable. 4 2 It is important to note that it is
not a disciplinary rule. 4 In fact, the ABA warned that "if the
'appearance of impropriety' language had been made a disciplinary
rule, 'it is likely that the determination of whether particular conduct
violated the rule would have degenerated ... into a determination
on an instinctive, or even ad hominem basis .... ' "144 Similarly,
[t]he Rules reject the "appearance of impropriety" test. The draft-
ers thought that it was too loose and vague; it gave no fair warning
and it allowed, if not encouraged, instinctivejudgments. Also, one
can not begin to define "appearance of impropriety" unless one
first defines "impropriety," and the purported "test" does
neither. 1
4 5
ButJudge Clark did not recognize this difference between the Model
Code and the Model Rules, claiming instead that, "the new Rules of
Conduct do not greatly alter the present law on conflicts of inter-
est."1 46 Judge Clark thought that the impact of the new rules would
be minimal because "the Bankruptcy Code and Rules contain their
own anticonflict provisions ... independent of any requirements set
forth in the Code of Professional Responsibility."' 147 However, this
ignores the confusion as to what these anticonflict provisions actually
mean, and how far they extend. 1
48
The Model Code's anti-conflict provisions are set out in Canons
142 See, e.g., R. ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 17 (2d ed. 1988)
(explaining why the drafters of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility
rejected the appearance of impropriety standard).
143 See id. at 17.
144 Id. at 17-18 (quoting ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility, Formal Opinion 342 (1975)).
145 Id. at 18.
146 In re Roberts, 46 Bankr. 815, 836-37 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, 75 Bankr. 402 (D. Utah 1937) (en banc).
147 Id. at 836.
148 Id. at 840-44 (noting cases which do and do not fall within the anticonflict
provisions); see also Note, Bankrupcy Code Section 327(a) - New Interpretation Forces
Attorneys to Waive Fees or Wave Good-bye to Clients, 53 Mo. L. REV. 309, 312 & n.23
(1988).
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4, 5 and 6.149 Of these, the most applicable is Canon 5, which states:
"A Lawyer Should Exercise Independent Professional Judgment on
Behalf of a Client."' 50 Complementing this Canon is Disciplinary
Rule 5-101, entitled "Refusing Employment When the Interests of
the Lawyer May Impair His Independent ProfessionalJudgment."1'1
Subsection (A) provides, "[e]xcept with the consent of his client after full
disclosure, a lawyer shall not accept employment if the exercise of his
professional judgment on behalf of his client will be or reasonably
may be affected by his own financial, business, property, or personal
interests." '152 This is also the approach taken by the Model Rules.
153
However, in Bankruptcy, courts have stated that the client's consent
is irrelevant, as is the consent of all the creditors.' 54 This differing
treatment of attorneys when they are in Bankruptcy as opposed to
other courts is unwise. "'The very concept of a professional ethic
precludes the varying of ethical principles when applied to different
areas of the law.' Applying more rigid ethical standards to attorneys
practicing in bankruptcy courts could foster 'the belief that bank-
ruptcy proceedings and bankruptcy attorneys need closer
scrutiny." 1
55
A critical difference between a debtor's attorney and an attorney
in any other legal battle is that the bankruptcy attorney is working for
the benefit of the estate, rather than for any particular person.
156
Since the estate, when insolvent, is in fact owned by parties other
than the debtor, the attorney is working for the creditors of the
estate as well. It is for this reason that mere consent to the conflict
by the debtor is not enough. However, there should be no reason
for a court to deny the debtor her choice of counsel when none of
149 See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canons 4-6 (1989).
150 Id. at Canon 5. Canon 4 states: "A Lawyer Should Preserve the Confidences
and Secrets of a Client." Canon 6 states: "A Lawyer Should Represent a Client
Completely."
151 Id. at DR 5-101.
152 Id. (emphasis added).
153 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1989) (providing
general rule in instance of conflict of interest similar to Model Code DR 5-101).
154 See supra note 67 and accompanying text; see also In re Roberts, 75 Bankr. 402,
404 (D. Utah 1987) (involving court denial of all fees upon discovery of undisclosed
conflicts, even though the representation led to an uncontested reorganization plan
calling for full payment to all creditors).
155 Note, supra note 148, at 323-24 (quoting Stranko, Attorney Conflicts of Interest in
Bankruptcy Proceedings, 9 J. LEGAL PROF. 229, 229 (1984)).
156 See In re Roberts, 46 Bankr. 815, 822 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985) (stating that an
important consideration is that the attorney's employment be "'in the best interest
of the estate.'" (citation omitted)), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 75 Bankr. 402 (D. Utah
1987) (en banc).
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the creditors object.1 5 7 The court should even be able to allow rep-
resentation over the objections of creditors when these objections
are not made in good faith.
1 58
B. The Solution
In order to implement these suggestions and to provide consis-
tency to future bankruptcy decisions, the Bankruptcy Code should be
amended. The author proposes the following:
(1) Carve out a special. exception from 327(a) for the debtor in
possession's pre-bankruptcy attorney. This should apply only to
attorneys, since other professionals are not subject to bar associa-
tions' ethical standards concerning conflicts of interests.
(2) Allow the pre-bankruptcy attorney to represent her client
upon disclosure and consent, similar to Rule 1.7 of the Model Rules
of Professional Responsibility. However, since the attorney is actu-
ally representing the estate,, consent of other parties in interest must
also be obtained.
(3) Objections to the representation by any party other than the
debtor in possession may be overruled by the Bankruptcy judge if
the objection is not made in good faith or if the equities of the case
so demand. For example, if the majority of the creditors approve,
the judge may overlook the objections if she believes that the inter-
ests of those dissenting creditors will not be seriously impaired.
(4) A claim that is not disclosed should be deemed automatically
waived. Material non-disclosure may still subject the attorney to for-
feiture of fees for a violation of Bankruptcy Rule 2014.
(5) A secured claim should be deemed automatically converted
to an unsecured claim upon approval of counsel by the parties or the
judge. This will remove the conflict of the attorney having to void
her own security interest. If the attorney does not want to lose the
secured status, she must choose not to represent the debtor.
(6) Retainers may be taken in any form, although they remain
the property of the estate until the final decree. Certain common-
sense rules must apply to keep the attorney from working in opposi-
157 See Roberts, 46 Bankr. at 825 n.19 (noting that "in rural areas, the cure for the
potential conflict has been at great cost and is in all likelihood worse than the
disease").
158 See In re Best W. Heritage Inn Partnership, 79 Bankr. 736, 741 (Bankr. E.D.
Tenn. 1987) (ignoring the objection of a creditor because the court was "not so
gullible as to believe that [the creditor wanted the] lawyers fired for the protection of
the bankruptcy estate as a whole").
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tion to the reorganization effort. The attorney cannot gather the
most promising assets, since they will need to be used in the reor-
ganization process. Similarly, the attorney must gain the court's
approval before foreclosing upon a mortgage, just as she needs
approval for interim fees.
C. The Application
Through these rule changes, the Bankruptcy Code will properly
balance the rights of debtors in possession to choose their own coun-
sel against the actual concerns of the estate. The proposed rules are
clear enough to lead to predictability, yet flexible enough to weigh
the individual equities on a case-by-case basis. Of course, full disclo-
sure of conflicts is still required under Bankruptcy Rule 2014, 159 but
the incentive and the ability of attorneys to bury the facts are less-
ened under this plan. Attorneys will not be in the position of being
either automatically disqualified from representation because of a
claim or having to waive the claim completely.' 6 Thus, they can rest
assured that they can represent their client and still collect a dis-
closed past fee, barring creditor objections. Creditor objections
must be well-founded. 6 ' Thejudge may overrule an objection if the
situation so demands.'
62
If the debtor's attorney fails to disclose a prior claim it will be
void and no longer payable out of the estate: an attorney must dis-
close in order to be paid. Without disclosure, the attorney will know
in no uncertain terms that the claim is lost. Thus, no conflict will
arise because there is, in effect, a waiver of the past claim. Without a
past claim, the attorney is no longer a creditor of the estate, and
objections by the other creditors are of no weight.
The question as to what qualifies as "disclosure" is also satisfied
by the proposed changes. The attorney, instead of having to sign a
blanket statement that she is "disinterested under the meaning of
§ 327(a)," must prominently state the approximate amount of her
claim, which of course will be unsecured.16 3 The amount of the
attorney's claim may not be hidden in schedules, but must appear in
159 See supra note 22.
160 See Note, supra note 148, at 321.
161 See supra text accompanying note 109.
162 See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
163 This is a result of the proposed amendments in which all secured claims of
the debtor's attorney are automatically converted into unsecured ones upon
acceptance by the court of the attorney's application for employment.
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them if appropriate."' 4 The situation surrounding the past claim
need not be included in the statement, although attorneys will prob-
ably wish to present the facts in order to quell possible objections by
the other attorneys.'
65
If the situation surrounding the past fees is unfavorable and
would actually bias the attorney's representation, professional ethics
rules apply to prohibit representation. This removes the concern
that unfavorable fact patterns will be unknown to creditors, since
sanctions may be imposed by the bar association, under Rule 1.7 of
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, if there was in fact an
undisclosed conflict of interest. 166 Similarly, fees can be denied for a
violation of rule 2014 of the Bankruptcy Code.
167
Bankruptcy retainers are clarified by the proposed amendments
as well. Under the amendments, there is technically no such thing as
a secured retainer, although the bankruptcy fees are given a priority
over other secured creditors.' 6l  Since retainers of any kind are con-
sidered property of the estate until the final decree, 16' it does not
matter what the parties call ithem. The cash from the retainer may be
reclaimed and disposed of for purposes of reorganization,170 and a
mortgage can have no effect if the property is necessary for an equi-
table distribution.1 7 ' However, if a mortgage is taken in property
that will probably not be liquidated in the proceeding, the mortgage
may stand to insure that the fees can be paid at the conclusion of the
case.172 A foreclosure on the mortgage before the final decree can
only be executed if approved by the court. 173 These interim fees are
164 For example, the claim must be included in the schedule of the 20 largest
creditors if it is applicable.
165 Since other attorneys can object if they are uncomfortable or unsure of the
situation, it would be wise for the debtor's attorney to provide as much information
concerning the circumstances of the debt as possible.
166 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcT Rule 1.7 (1989).
167 See supra note 22.
168 Expenses from administration of the estate are given priority under §§ 726,
507 and 502 of the Bankruptcy Code.
169 See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
170 See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
171 See In re Automend, Inc., 85 Bankr. 173, 177 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988)
(disapproving of a situation in which, "the security interest in accounts in this case
took a prime bite out of one of the 'most promising assets of the estate'" (quoting In
re Martin, 817 F.2d 175, 181 (1st Cir. 1987))).
172 See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
173 For example, in In re Whitman, 51 Bankr. 502, 507 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1985),
the attorney foreclosed on the debtor's property, thus depriving "the debtor of his
ability to sell his major asset... and depriv[ing] his creditors of the hope of receiving
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subject to forfeiture at a later date, because orders approving interim
fees are not final until the bankruptcy proceeding is over.1
74
CONCLUSION
These proposed amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, along
with the explanations offered in this Comment, could settle the con-
fusion and conflict between what the Code actually says and what
courts have claimed it actually means. They strike the proper bal-
ance in most cases between the conflicting interests at stake, and lead
to predictable results. The uncertainty of how a court would rule on
the issue has led to intentional and unintentional semantic games by
"interested" attorneys. After implementation of the proposed
changes, the Bankruptcy arena would no longer resemble a circus
arena, and the courts and attorneys would no longer be forced to
perform linguistic gymnastics.
a dividend in the chapter 13 case." Pursuant to my proposals, the attorney would
need the court's permission before attempting such a foreclosure.
174 See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
1990] 1759

